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Abstract—The problem of symmetric private information re-
trieval (SPIR) from replicated databases with colluding servers
and adversaries is studied. Specifically, the database comprises
K files, which are replicatively stored among N servers. A user
wants to retrieve one file from the database by communicating
with the N servers, without revealing the identity of the desired
file to any server. Furthermore, the user shall learn nothing
about the other K − 1 files in the database. Any T out
of N servers may collude, that is, they may communicate
their interactions with the user to guess the identity of the
requested file. An adversary in the system can tap in on
or even try to corrupt the communication. Three types of
adversaries are considered: a Byzantine adversary who can
overwrite the transmission of any B servers to the user; a
passive eavesdropper who can tap in on the incoming and
outgoing transmissions of any E servers; and a combination
of both – an adversary who can tap in on a set of any E
nodes, and overwrite the transmission of a set of any B nodes.
The problems of SPIR with colluding servers and the three
types of adversaries are named T-BSPIR, T-ESPIR and T-
BESPIR respectively. The capacity of the problem is defined
as the maximum number of information bits of the desired file
retrieved per downloaded bit. We show that the information-
theoretical capacity of the T-BSPIR problem equals 1− 2B+T
N
, if
the servers share common randomness (unavailable at the user)
with amount at least 2B+T
N−2B−T
times the file size. Otherwise,
the capacity equals zero. The information-theoretical capacity
of the T-ESPIR problem is proved to equal 1 −
max(T,E)
N
, if
the servers share common randomness with amount at least
max(T,E)
N−max(T,E)
times the file size. Finally, for the problem of T-
BESPIR, the capacity is proved to be 1−
2B+max(T,E)
N
, where
the common randomness shared by the servers should be at
least
2B+max(T,E)
N−2B−max(T,E)
times the file size. The results resemble
those of secure network coding problems with adversaries and
eavesdroppers.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the situation where a user wants to retrieve a file from
a remotely stored database, the nature of the data might be
privacy-sensitive, for example medical records, stock prices
etc., such that the user does not want to reveal the identity of
the data retrieved. This is known as the problem of private
information retrieval (PIR). In some cases, the privacy of the
database needs also to be preserved. For example, if a user
wants to retrieve his/her medical data from a database, it is
hoped that the user obtains no information about other users’
medical records. This is known as the problem of symmetric
private information retrieval (SPIR).
The problem of SPIR was firstly studied in the computer
science society. It is shown that if the database is stored
at a single server, the only possible scheme for the user is
to download the entire database to guarantee information-
theoretic privacy [1], [2], which is inefficient in practice. It is
further shown that the communication cost can be reduced in
sublinear scale by replicating the database at multiple non-
colluding servers [2]. To further protect the privacy of the
database, the problem of SPIR is introduced [3], such that
the user obtains no more information regarding the database
other than the requested file. In [1]–[3], the database is
modeled as a bit string, and the user wishes to retrieve
a single bit. In these works, the communication cost is
measured as the sum of the transmission at the querying
phase from user to servers and at the downloading phase
from servers to user.
When the file size is significantly large and the target is to
minimize the communication cost of only the downloading
phase, the metric of the downloading cost is defined as the
number of bits downloaded per bit of the retrieved file, and
the reciprocal of which is named the PIR capacity. A series
of recent works derive information-theoretic limits of various
versions of the PIR problem [4]–[10] etc. The leading work
in the area is by Sun and Jafar [4], where the authors find
the capacity of the PIR problem with replicated databases. In
subsequent works by Sun and Jafar [5], [6], the PIR capacity
with duplicated databases and colluding servers, and the SPIR
capacity with duplicated (non-colluding) databases are de-
rived. In [7]–[9], Banawan and Ulukus find the capacity of the
PIR problem with coded databases, multi-message PIR with
replicated databases, and the PIR problem with colluding and
Byzantine databases. In our previous work [10], we derive
the capacity of the SPIR problem with coded databases.
Another series of works focus more on the coding structure
of the storage system, and study schemes and information
limits for various PIR problems with coded databases [11]–
[15]. In [11], PIR is achieved by downloading one extra bit
other than the desired file, given that the number of storage
nodes grows with file size, which can be impractical in some
storage systems. In [12], storage overhead can be reduced
by increasing the number of storage nodes. In [13], tradeoff
between storage cost and downloading cost is analyzed.
Subsequently in [14], explicit schemes which match the
tradeoff in [13] are presented. It is worth noting that in [7],
the capacity of PIR for coded database is settled, which
improves the results in [13], [14]. Recently in [15], the
authors present a framework for PIR from coded database
with colluding servers.
In this work, we study the SPIR version of the problem
in [9], that is, SPIR from replicated databases with colluding
and Byzantine servers. We also study the SPIR problem
with a passive eavesdropper, then generalize to the case
with an adversary who can both eavesdrop and corrupt the
communication. In analogy to previous works on SPIR [6],
[10], in the non-trivial context where the database comprises
at least two files, the storage nodes need to share common
randomness which is independent from the database and
meanwhile unavailable to the user. Furthermore, in the case
with an eavesdropper who can tap in on a set of the nodes
and is curious about the database, the utility of the shared
common randomness is two-fold in the sense that it also
protect the database from the eavesdropper. Briefly speaking,
in this work, we study the SPIR problem with replicated
databases, where a database with K files are replicated at N
servers. Any T out of the N servers may collude, that is,
they may share their communication with the user to infer
the identity of the requested file. The communication in the
system is not secure, that is, there is an adversary who can
tap in on or even corrupt the transmissions in the system. We
consider three types of adversaries, a Byzantine adversary
who can overwrite the transmission of any B servers to the
user, named T-BSPIR; a passive eavesdropper who can tap
in on the incoming and outgoing transmissions of any E
servers, named T-ESPIR; and a combination of both – an
adversary who can tap in on a set of any E nodes, and
overwrite the transmission of a set of any B nodes (the
two sets may overlap), named T-BESPIR. We show that
the information-theoretical capacity of the T-BSPIR problem
equals 1 − 2B+T
N
, if the servers share common randomness
(unavailable at the user) with amount at least T
N−2B−T times
the file size. Otherwise, the capacity equals zero. This is
presented in Theorem 1. The information-theoretical capacity
of the T-ESPIR problem is proved to equal 1− max(T,E)
N
, if
the servers share common randomness with amount at least
max(T,E)
N−max(T,E) times the file size. This is presented in Theo-
rem 2. Finally in Section VI-A, we show that for the problem
of T-BESPIR, the capacity is 1 − 2B+max(T,E)
N
, where the
common randomness shared by the servers should be at least
max(T,E)
N−2B−max(T,E) times the file size. The results resemble the
capacity of secure network coding with adversaries [16].
II. MODEL
A. Notations
Let [m : n] denote the set {m,m+ 1, . . . , n} for m ≤ n.
For the sake of brevity, denote the set of random variables
{Xm, Xm+1, . . . , Xn} by X[m:n] . The transpose of matrix
G is denoted by GT.
B. Problem Description
Database: A database comprises K independent files, de-
noted by W1, . . . ,WK , which are replicated at N nodes
(servers). Each file consists of L symbols drawn indepen-
dently and uniformly from the finite field Fq. Therefore, for
any k ∈ [1 : K],
H(Wk) = L log q ; H(W1, . . . ,WK) = KL log q.
User queries: A user wants to retrieve a file Wκ with
index κ from the database, where the desired file index κ is
uniformly distributed among [1 : K]. Let U denote a random
variable privately generated by the user, which represents the
randomness of the query scheme followed by the user. The
random variable U is generated before the realizations of the
messages or the desired file index. Let the realization of the
file index κ be k, based on the realization of the desired
file index k and the realization of U , the user generates and
sends queries to all nodes, where the query received by node-
n is denoted by Q
[k]
n . Let Q = [Q
[k]
n ]n∈[1:N ],k∈[1:K] denote
the complete query scheme, namely, the collection of all
queries under all cases of desired file index. We have that
H(Q|U) = 0.
Node common randomness: Let random variable S denote
the common randomness shared by all nodes, the realization
of which is known to all nodes but unavailable to the user.
The common randomness is utilized to protect database-
privacy (2) below. For any node n ∈ [1 : N ], a random
variable Sn is generated from S, which is used in the answer
scheme followed by node n. Hence, H(S1, . . . , Sn|S) = 0.
Node answers: The nodes generate answers according to
the agreed scheme with the user based on the received
query Q
[k]
n , the stored database, and the random variable
Sn generated from the common randomness. The answer
generated and sent to the user by node n is denoted by A
[k]
n .
Adversary: Three types of adversaries are considered in
this work. The first type is called Byzantine adversaries,
who can overwrite the answers of a set B of at most B
nodes, called corrupted nodes, pretending to send answers
to the user from the corrupted nodes to confuse the user.
The nodes that are not corrupted by the adversary are called
authentic nodes. The user has no knowledge of the identity
of the corrupted nodes. The answers overwritten and sent
to the user are denoted by A˜
[k]
B . We assume the Byzantine
adversary is omniscient, that is, the adversary can tap in on
all transmissions and corrupt the B answers in a worst-case
way that confuses the user the most. The model considered
in [9], where there are B Byzantine adversarial nodes who
send arbitrary or worst-case answers to the user, can be
considered as a special case where the adversary can only
taps on the transmissions of the B nodes chosen to corrupt,
i.e. the adversary has less knowledge.1
The second type adversary considered is called passive
eavesdroppers, who can tap in on the incoming and outgoing
transmissions of E nodes in the system. The eavesdropper is
“nice but curious”, in the sense that the goal of the eavesdrop-
per is to obtain some information about the database, without
corrupting any transmission. The user has no knowledge of
1For zero-error decodability, the knowledge of the adversary does not
affect the result, because the adversary could “happen” to generate the worst-
case corrupted answers without knowing the transmissions in the system, in
which case the communication scheme should still prevent the user from
decoding the desired file wrong.
the identity of the nodes tapped on by the eavesdropper.
The third type of adversary considered is a combination
of the above two types. The adversary can tap in on the
incoming and outgoing communications of any set E with E
nodes, and can overwrite the answers of any set B with B
nodes. The two sets may intersect. In this case, the adversary
is not omniscient and does not tap in on the nodes that are
in B but not in E .
T-BSPIR and T-ESPIR: Based on the received answers
A
[k]
[1:N ] (for the case with Byzantine adversary, we abuse the
notation and let A
[k]
[1:N ] = {A
[k]
[1:N ]\B, A˜
[k]
B }) and the query
scheme Q, the user shall be able to decode the requested file
Wk with zero error. Any set of T nodes may collude to guess
the requested file index, by communicating their interactions
with the user. Two privacy constraints must be satisfied:
• User-privacy: any T colluding nodes shall not be able
to obtain any information regarding the identity of the
requested file, i.e.,
I(κ;Q
[κ]
T , A
[κ]
T ,W[1:K], S) = 0, ∀T ⊂ [1 : N ], |T | = T.
(1)
• Database-privacy: the user shall learn no information
regarding other files in the database, that is, defining
Wκ¯ = {W1, . . . ,Wκ−1,Wκ+1, . . . ,WK},
I(Wκ¯;A
[κ]
[1:N ],Q, κ) = 0. (2)
For the case with passive eavesdropper and the case with
the combination adversary, one more privacy constraint must
be satisfied to protect the database from the eavesdropper. For
any node set E with at most E nodes, and for any k ∈ [1 : K]:
I(W[1:K];Q
[k]
E , A
[k]
E ) = 0. (3)
We use the same definition as in [10] for rate and capacity
of T-BSPIR, T-ESPIR and T-BESPIR schemes. (We state
only the definitions in terms of T-BSPIR.)
Definition 1. The rate of a T-BSPIR scheme is the num-
ber of information bits of the requested file retrieved per
downloaded answer bit. By symmetry among all files, for
any k ∈ [1 : K],
RT-BSPIR ,
H(Wk)∑N
n=1H(A
[k]
n )
.
The capacity CT-BSPIR is the supremum of RT-BSPIR over all
T-BSPIR schemes.
Definition 2. The secrecy rate is the amount of common
randomness shared by the storage nodes relative to the file
size, that is
ρT-BSPIR ,
H(S)
H(Wk)
.
III. MAIN RESULT
A. T-BSPIR
When there is only one file in the database, i.e. K = 1,
database-privacy is guaranteed automatically, because there
is no other file to protect from the user in the database.
Therefore, the T-BSPIR problem reduces to T-BPIR problem,
and from [9], the capacity is 1− 2B
N
if N > 2B+T . In fact,
when K = 1, user-privacy is also trivial, since there is only
one file that the user can request for. That is the reason the
parameter T is not in the capacity 1 − 2B
N
. Therefore, the
condition can be relaxed to that if N ≥ 2B+1, the capacity
of T-BSPIR when K = 1 is 1 − 2B
N
. If N ≤ 2B, the user
cannot successfully retrieve the file regardless of how much
information downloaded, i.e. the capacity is 0. When K ≥ 2,
T-BSPIR is non-trivial and our main result is summarized
below.
Theorem 1. For symmetric private information retrieval
from a database with K ≥ 2 files which are replicated at
N nodes, where any T nodes may collude and a Byzantine
adversary can corrupt the answers of any B nodes, if
N > 2B + T , the capacity is
CT-BSPIR =
{
1− 2B+T
N
, if ρT-BSPIR ≥
T
N−2B−T
0, otherwise
.
Remark: In [9], the authors show that the T-BPIR capacity
is N−2B
N
·
1− T
N−2B
1−( T
N−2B )
K
. It can be observed that as the number
of files K tends to infinity, their T-BPIR capacity approaches
our T-BSPIR capacity. The intuition is that, when the number
of files increases, the penalty in the downloading rate to pro-
tect database-privacy decays. When there are asymptotically
infinitely many files, the information rate the user can learn
about the database from finite downloaded symbols vanishes.
B. T-ESPIR
When there is only one file in the database, the database-
privacy and user-privacy become trivial. The only privacy
constraint needed to be guaranteed is that the eavesdropper
learns no information of the database (3). It can be easily
checked that the capacity equals 1 − E
N
. When K ≥ 2, the
capacity of T-ESPIR is summarized below.
Theorem 2. For symmetric private information retrieval
from a database with K ≥ 2 files which are replicated at N
nodes, where any T nodes may collude and an eavesdropper
can tapped on the communication of any E nodes, the
capacity is
CT-ESPIR =
{
1− max (T,E)
N
, if ρT-ESPIR ≥
max (T,E)
N−max (T,E)
0, otherwise
.
IV. T-BSPIR
A. Achievability
In this section, we present a general scheme which
achieves the maximum T-BSPIR rate 1 − 2B+T
N
when the
secrecy rate is T
N−2B−T . The main concepts of the construc-
tion are:
• The queries received by any set of T nodes are mutually
independent, and are independent of the desired file
index k. This is achieved by expanding T independent
query vectors with an (N, T )-MDS code.
• Because the answers received from any B nodes might
be erroneous, the N answers are formalized in a form of
(N,N − 2B)-MDS code, such that the user can correct
up to B errors.
Assume each file comprises L = N − 2B − T
symbols from a large enough field Fq .
2 Let the vector
W = (w
[1]
1 , . . . , w
[1]
N−2B−T , . . . , w
[K]
1 , . . . , w
[K]
N−2B−T ) rep-
resent the database, which is stored at each server. The user
wants to retrieve Wk = (w
[k]
1 , . . . , w
[k]
N−2B−T ) privately.
The user generates the queries following the steps below:
Step 1: Generates T independent uniformly random vectors
U1, . . . , UT of length K(N − 2B − T ) over Fq . Let the
K(N − 2B − T )× T matrix U denote [U1, . . . , UT ].
Step 2: Let e
[k]
i denote the length-(K(N − 2B − T )) unit
vector where only the
(
(k − 1)(N − 2B − T ) + i
)
th entry
is 1 and all the other entries are 0’s. The purpose of e
[k]
i is
to retrieve the ith entry of Wk. Let the K(N − 2B − T )×
(N − 2B − T ) matrix e denote [e
[k]
1 , e
[k]
2 , . . . , e
[k]
N−2B−T ].
Step 3: Let {λ1, . . . , λN} be N distinct nonzero elements
from Fq . Let GU be the generating matrix of an (N, T )-
generalized-Reed-Solomon (GRS) code with code locators
{λ1, . . . , λN} and column multipliers all be 1. That is,
GU =


1 1 . . . 1
λ1 λ2 . . . λN
...
...
. . .
...
λT−11 λ
T−1
2 . . . λ
T−1
N

. (4)
Let Ge be the generating matrix of an (N,N − 2B − T )-
GRS code with code locators {λ1, . . . , λN} and column
multipliers {λT−11 , . . . , λ
T−1
N }. That is,
Ge =


1 1 . . . 1
λ1 λ2 . . . λN
...
...
. . .
...
λN−2B−T−11 λ
N−2B−T−1
2 . . . λ
N−2B−T−1
N


(5)
· diag(λT−11 , λ
T−1
2 , . . . , λ
T−1
N ) (6)
=


λT1 λ
T
2 . . . λ
T
N
λT+11 λ
T+1
2 . . . λ
T+1
N
...
...
. . .
...
λN−2B−11 λ
N−2B−1
2 . . . λ
N−2B−1
N

 . (7)
Step 4: Generate the N query vectors Q
[k]
1 , . . . , Q
[k]
n by
[Q
[k]
1 , . . . , Q
[k]
n ] = UGU + eGe (8)
= [U, e] ·
[
GU
Ge
]
(9)
The user sends the query vectors generated from equa-
tion (9) to the servers.
All the servers share T symbols S1, . . . , ST that are
uniformly and independently chosen from Fq, which are
unavailable to the user. The servers generate their answers
2The field size should be large enough such that the MDS codes used in
the construction exist.
by taking the inner product of the query vectors they receive
and the stored data vector, then add on a linear combination
of S1, . . . , ST . Specifically,
A[k]n = 〈Q
[k]
n ,W〉+
T∑
j=1
λj−1n Sj . (10)
There are at most B servers corrupted by the Byzantine
adversary, who generate arbitrary (or even malicious) answers
A˜
[k]
n to confuse the user. Assume the Byzantine adversary
generates answers of the same size as the authentic servers,
i.e. the size the user expects to receive, otherwise the user
can easily identify the erroneous answers.
To see that the user can decodeWk successfully, firstly we
look at the N correct answers. Denote Xj = 〈Uj ,W〉+ Sj ,
where j = 1, . . . , T . From (9) and (10), A
[k]
n = X1+λnX2+
· · ·+λT−1n XT +λ
T
nw
[k]
1 + · · ·+λ
N−2B−1
n w
[k]
N−2B−T . Hence,
[A
[k]
1 , . . . , A
[k]
n ] = [X1, . . . , XT , w
[k]
1 , . . . , w
[k]
N−2B−T ] ·G,
(11)
where
G = [GU,Ge]
T
=


1 1 . . . 1
λ1 λ2 . . . λN
...
...
. . .
...
λN−2B−11 λ
N−2B−1
2 . . . λ
N−2B−1
N

 . (12)
It can be observed that G is the generating matrix of an
(N,N − 2B)-GRS code with code locators {λ1, . . . , λN}
and column multipliers all be 1. Therefore, when at most
B symbols out of [A
[k]
1 , . . . , A
[k]
n ] are wrong, the user can
still successfully decode [X1, . . . , XT , w
[k]
1 , . . . , w
[k]
N−2B−T ],
which include all symbols of Wk .
It is obvious that database-privacy is guaranteed. Because
besides Wk, the user solves T symbols Xj = 〈Uj ,W〉+Sj ,
j = 1, . . . , T . Because S1, . . . , ST are independent uniform
symbols drawn from Fq , the user can obtain no information
about the linear combinations of the database from the Xj’s.
To see that user-privacy is guaranteed, from (9), because
U1, . . . , UT are T independent random vectors and GU is
the generating matrix of an (N, T )-GRS code, any T column
vectors of UGU are still independent uniform random vec-
tors. Hence, by adding deterministic column vectors of eGe,
any T query vectors are still independent uniform random
vectors, and are independent from the desired file index.
Therefore, any T colluding nodes cannot infer the desired
file index.
To conclude, the rate achieved by this scheme is
N−2B−T
N
= 1 − 2B+T
N
with secrecy rate T
N−2B−T , which
matches the capacity.
B. Converse
In this section, we prove the converse part of Theorem 1.
Lemmas 3-5 below are the versions with colluding servers
and replicated databases of Lemmas 2-4 in [10] (and Lemmas
1-2 in [6]). Hence we state the lemmas with sketch proofs.
For any set of nodes that are not corrupted by the adversary,
given their received queries, the answers generated by these
nodes do not depend on other queries. Because besides the
received queries, the answers depend on the database and
the shared common randomness, which are independent with
other queries. Lemma 3 below states that this also holds if
conditioned on the requested file.
Lemma 3. For any set of nodes N ⊂ [1 : N ] that are not
corrupted by the adversary,
H(A
[k]
N |Q,Wk, Q
[k]
N ) = H(A
[k]
N |Wk, Q
[k]
N ).
Proof:We first show that I(A
[k]
N ;Q|Wk, Q
[k]
N ) ≤ 0, as follows
I(A
[k]
N ;Q|Wk, Q
[k]
N ) ≤ I(A
[k]
N ,W[1:K], S;Q|Wk, Q
[k]
N )
(a)
= I(W[1:K], S;Q|Wk, Q
[k]
N )
≤ I(W[1:K], S;Q) = 0,
where (a) holds because the answers are deterministic func-
tions of the database, common randomness, and the queries.
In the last step, I(W[1:K], S;Q) = 0 holds because the
queries do not depend on the database and common ran-
domness.
On the other hand, it is immediate that
I(A
[k]
N ;Q|Wk, Q
[k]
N ) ≥ 0. Therefore, H(A
[k]
N |Wk, Q
[k]
N ) =
H(A
[k]
N |Q,Wk, Q
[k]
N ). 
Lemma 4. For any set of nodes T ⊂ [1 : N ] with size
|T | = T that are not corrupted by the adversary,
H(A
[k]
T |Q
[k]
T ) = H(A
[k′ ]
T |Q
[k′]
T ), (13)
H(A
[k]
T |Wk, Q
[k]
T ) = H(A
[k′ ]
T |Wk, Q
[k′]
T ). (14)
Proof: The proof is similar as that of Lemma 1 in [6]. We
omit the detailed proof here. The key idea is that since any T
nodes may collude, the statistical distribution of the queries
and answers of any T nodes shall be the same regardless of
the requested file index, even if the nodes condition on a part
of the database, for exampleWk. Otherwise, the T nodes can
differentiate between the cases where Wk is requested and
Wk′ is requested. 
Lemma 5. For any set of nodes T ⊂ [1 : N ] with size
|T | = T that are not corrupted by the adversary,
H(A
[k]
T |Wk, Q
[k]
T ) = H(A
[k′]
T |Q
[k′]
T ).
Proof: By database-privacy (2), I(Wk¯;A
[k′ ]
[1:N ],Q) = 0. For
any k 6= k′, because Wk ∈ Wk¯′ , we have
0 = I(Wk;A
[k′]
T , Q
[k′]
T )
= I(Wk;A
[k′]
T |Q
[k′]
T ) + I(Wk;Q
[k′]
T )
(a)
= I(Wk;A
[k′]
T |Q
[k′]
T )
= H(A
[k′ ]
T |Q
[k′]
T )−H(A
[k′]
T |Wk, Q
[k′]
T )
(b)
= H(A
[k′]
T |Q
[k′]
T )−H(A
[k]
T |Wk, Q
[k]
T ),
where equality (a) holds because Wk is independent of the
queries, and equality (b) follows by (14). 
Lemma 6 below states that the user should be able to
decode the desired file from any N − 2B authentic nodes.
This is similar as Lemma 4 in [9], developed from the cut-
set bound in the network coding problem [17], [18], and the
distributed storage problem [19]. The difference between our
Lemma 6 and Lemma 4 in [9] is that instead of arguing
that the answers from any N − 2B authentic nodes must be
unique for every realization of the database, we argue that it
only needs to hold for any realization of the requested file
Wk. For different realizations of the database that differ on
files other than Wk , the interference may still be the same
hence the user can successfully decode. We reprise the proof
of Lemma 4 in [9] with slight modification for the proof of
Lemma 6 below.
Lemma 6. For any set of authentic nodesH ∈ [1 : N ] where
|H| = N − 2B, for correctly decoding Wk , the answers A
[k]
H
are unique for every realization of Wk. That is, there cannot
exist two realizations of the kth file, Wk 6= W˜k, such that
A
[k]
H (Wk) = A
[k]
H (W˜k). Consequently, H(Wk|A
[k]
H ,Q) = 0.
Proof: Divide the nodes [1 : N ] \ H into two size-B sets,
denoted by B1 and B2. The scheme shall allow the user to
correctly decode Wk if any B nodes in [1 : N ] \ H are
corrupted by the Byzantine adversary, with any corrupted
answers. Consider the following two cases:
• Case 1: The true realization of the kth file is Wk. The
user downloads A
[k]
H (Wk) from the authentic nodes in
H. The nodes in B1 are also authentic, who generates the
answers A
[k]
B1
(Wk). The nodes in B2 are the corrupted
nodes, the answers from which overwritten by the
adversary “happened” to be generated with the agreed
scheme but by replacing the kth file with W˜k, denoted
by A˜
[k]
B2
= A
[k]
B2
(W˜k).
• Case 2: The true realization of the kth file is W˜k. The
user downloads A
[k]
H (W˜k) from the authentic nodes in
H. The nodes in B2 are also authentic, who generates
the answers A
[k]
B2
(W˜k). The nodes in B1 are corrupted,
the answers from which overwritten by the adversary
“happened” to be generated with the agreed scheme but
by replacing the kth file with Wk, hence generating
A˜
[k]
B1
= A
[k]
B1
(Wk).
If A
[k]
H (Wk) = A
[k]
H (W˜k), under both cases, the user
downloads the same set of answers from all nodes, i.e.,(
A
[k]
H (Wk) = A
[k]
H (W˜k), A
[k]
B1
(Wk), A
[k]
B2
(W˜k)
)
. Hence, the
user cannot successfully decode whether the kth file is Wk
or W˜k.
In conclusion, for any different realization of Wk, the
answers from H differs. In other words, the user should be
able to successfully decode the desired file from the N −2B
authentic nodes, . i.e., H(Wk|A
[k]
H ,Q) = 0. 
1) The proof for R ≤ CT-BSPIR : By Lemma 6, let H be a
set of N − 2B honest nodes, N − 2B ≥ T ,
H(Wk) = H(Wk)−H(Wk|A
[k]
H ,Q)
= I(Wk;A
[k]
H |Q)
= H(A
[k]
H |Q)−H(A
[k]
H |Wk,Q)
(a)
≤ H(A
[k]
H |Q)−H(A
[k]
T |Wk,Q)
(b)
= H(A
[k]
H |Q)−H(A
[k]
T |Wk, Q
[k]
T )
(c)
= H(A
[k]
H |Q)−H(A
[k′ ]
T |Q
[k′]
T )
(d)
= H(A
[k]
H |Q)−H(A
[k]
T |Q
[k]
T )
≤ H(A
[k]
H |Q)−H(A
[k]
T |Q)
In step (a), T can be any set of T nodes in H. Step (b)
holds by Lemma 3. Steps (c) and (d) follow by Lemma 5
and Lemma 4 respectively.
Averaging over all T with size T from H, we have that
H(Wk) ≤ H(A
[k]
H |Q)−
1(
N−2B
T
) ∑
T ∈H
|T |=T
H(A
[k]
T |Q).
By Han’s inequality [20],
1(
N−2B
T
) ∑
T ∈H
|T |=T
H(A
[k]
T |Q) ≥
T
N − 2B
H(A
[k]
H |Q).
Hence, H(Wk) ≤
N−2B−T
N−2B H(A
[k]
H |Q) ≤
N−2B−T
N−2B (N −
2B)H(A
[k]
h1
|Q) ≤ (N − 2B − T )H(A
[k]
h1
|Q), where h1 ∈ H
is an honest node.
Assume that the corrupted nodes send the same amount
of information bits to the user, otherwise the user can
easily identify the corrupted nodes. Hence, RT-BSPIR =
H(Wk)
∑
N
n=1H(A
[k]
n )
= H(Wk)
N ·H(A
[k]
h1
)
≤ 1− 2B+T
N
.
2) The proof for ρT-BSPIR ≥
T
N−2B−T : By database-
privacy,
0 = I(Wk¯;A
[k]
H |Q)
= H(Wk¯|Q)−H(Wk¯|A
[k]
H ,Q)
(a)
= H(Wk¯|Q,Wk)−H(Wk¯|A
[k]
H ,Q,Wk)
= I(Wk¯;A
[k]
H |Q,Wk)
(b)
≥ I(Wk¯;A
[k]
T |Q,Wk)
(c)
= H(A
[k]
T |Q,Wk)−H(A
[k]
T |Q,W[1:K])
+H(A
[k]
T |Q,W[1:K], S)
= H(A
[k]
T |Q,Wk)− I(S;A
[k]
T |Q,W[1:K])
≥ H(A
[k]
T |Q)−H(S),
where step (a) follows from Lemma 6 that the user should be
able to decodeWk from A
[k]
H . In step (b), T can be any set of
T nodes in H. Step (c) holds because the authentic answers
are deterministic functions of the queries, the database, and
the common randomness.
Averaging over all T ⊂ H, and from the proof in
Section IV-B1 above,
H(S) ≥
1(
N−2B
T
) ∑
T ⊂calH
|T |=T
H(A
[k]
T |Q)
≥
T
N − 2B
H(A
[k]
H |Q)
≥
T
N − 2B − T
H(Wk).
Hence, ρT-BSPIR =
H(S)
H(Wk)
≥ T
N−2B−T .
V. T-ESPIR
A. Achievability
Assume each file comprises L = N − max(T,E) sym-
bols from a large enough field Fq . Let the vector W =
(w
[1]
1 , . . . , w
[1]
N−max(T,E), . . . , w
[K]
1 , . . . , w
[K]
N−max(T,E)) rep-
resent the database, which is stored at each server. The user
wants to retrieve Wk = (w
[k]
1 , . . . , w
[k]
N−max(T,E)) privately.
The queries are generated in the following way. The user
firstly generate max(T,E) independent uniformly random
vectors U1, . . . , Umax(T,E) of length K(N − max(T,E))
over Fq . The user choose an (N,max(T,E))-GRS code
with generating matrix G(N,max (T,E)). Let e
[k]
i denote the
length-(K(N − max(T,E))) unit vector where only the(
(k− 1)(N −max(T,E)) + i
)
th entry is 1 and all the other
entries are 0’s. Again, the purpose of e
[k]
i is to retrieve the
ith entry of Wk. The query vectors are generated by
[Q
[k]
1 , . . . , Q
[k]
N ] = [U1, . . . , Umax(T,E)] ·G(N,max(T,E))
+ [0, . . . , 0, e
[k]
1 , . . . , e
[k]
N−max(T,E)].
(15)
The nodes share max(T,E) symbols
(S1, . . . , Smax(T,E)) = S, called common randomness,
that are uniformly and independently chosen from Fq. The
common randomness is unavailable to the user and the
eavesdropper. The servers generate their answers by taking
the inner product of the query vector and the stored data
vector, then add on a linear combination of the common
randomness in the following way,
A[k]n = 〈Q
[k]
n ,W〉+ 〈G(N,max (T,E))(n),S〉, (16)
where G(N,max (T,E))(n) denotes the nth column of matrix
G(N,max (T,E)). Let Xj = 〈Uj ,W〉 + Sj , where j =
1, . . . ,max(T,E), the answers received by the user are
[A
[k]
1 ,. . ., A
[k]
N ]=[X1,. . ., Xmax(T,E), w
[k]
1 ,. . ., w
[k]
N−max(T,E)]
·
[
G(N,max (T,E))
0 I
]
, (17)
where we omit the dimension of the zero matrix
0 and the identity matrix I because there is no
ambiguity. Because G(N,max (T,E)) is the generating
matrix of an (N,max(T,E))-GRS code, the matrix[
G(N,max(T,E))
0 I
]
is invertible. Therefore, the user can solve
[X1, . . . , Xmax(T,E), w
[k]
1 , . . . , w
[k]
N−max(T,E)], hence obtain
Wk.
To see that database-privacy is guaranteed, besides the
symbols of Wk , the user solves X1, . . . , Xmax(T,E), where
Xj = 〈Uj ,W〉 + Sj . Because S1, . . . , Smax(T,E) are inde-
pendent uniform symbols drawn from Fq, the user can obtain
no information about the database. User-privacy is also guar-
anteed, because from equation (15), every max(T,E) query
vectors are independently and uniformly distributed. Hence
every T nodes see independent and uniformly distributed
query vectors, no matter which file the user requests. To
see that the eavesdropper learns no information about the
database, the eavesdropper taps on the queries and answers
of E nodes. By the MDS property of GRS codes, any E
columns of G(N,max (T,E)) are linearly independent. From
equation (16), any E answers are protected by independent
linear combinations of S1, . . . , Smax(T,E). That is, for any E
nodes n1, . . . , nE , 〈G(N,max (T,E))(ni),S〉’s are statistically
independent and uniformly distributed. Hence, from any
E query and answer pairs, the eavesdropper obtains no
information about the database, i.e. (3) is satisfied.
B. Converse
In this section, we prove the converse part of Theorem 2.
We also use Lemmas 3-5 in Section IV-B for the proofs
below.
1) The proof for R ≤ CT-ESPIR : For any file Wk, k ∈
[1 : K], and any set of nodes N ∈ [1 : N ] with size |N | =
max (T,E),
H(Wk) = H(Wk|Q)−H(Wk|A
[k]
[1:N ],Q)
= H(A
[k]
[1:N ]|Q)−H(A
[k]
[1:N ]|Wk,Q)
≤ H(A
[k]
[1:N ]|Q)−H(A
[k]
N |Wk,Q, Q
[k]
N )
(a)
= H(A
[k]
[1:N ]|Q)−H(A
[k]
N |Wk, Q
[k]
N )
(b)
= H(A
[k]
[1:N ]|Q)−H(A
[k]
N |Q
[k]
N )
≤ H(A
[k]
[1:N ]|Q)−H(A
[k]
N |Q),
where (a) holds because given the queries Q
[k]
N , the answers
of N do not depend on other queries. If max(T,E) = T ,
by Lemma 5 and Lemma 4, we have that (b) holds; if
max(T,E) = E, from equation (3), I(Wk;A
[k]
N , Q
[k]
N ) = 0,
hence (b) also holds.
Averaging over all N with size max(T,E), we have that
H(Wk) ≤ H(A
[k]
[1:N ]|Q)−
1(
N
max(T,E)
) ∑
N∈[1:N ]
|N |=max(T,E)
H(A
[k]
N |Q).
By Han’s inequality [20],
1(
N
max(T,E)
) ∑
N∈[1:N ]
|N |=max(T,E)
H(A
[k]
N |Q) ≥
max(T,E)
N
H(A
[k]
[1:N ]|Q).
Therefore, RT-ESPIR =
H(Wk)
∑
N
n=1H(A
[k]
n )
≤ H(Wk)
H(A
[k]
[1:N ]
|Q)
≤ 1 −
max(T,E)
N
.
2) The proof for ρT-ESPIR ≥
max (T,E)
N−max (T,E) : For any set
of nodes N ∈ [1 : N ] with size |N | = max (T,E), from
database-privacy (2),
0 = I(Wk¯;A
[k]
[1:N ]|Q)
= H(Wk¯|Q)−H(Wk¯|A
[k]
[1:N ],Q)
= H(Wk¯|Q,Wk)−H(Wk¯|A
[k]
[1:N ],Q,Wk)
= I(Wk¯;A
[k]
[1:N ]|Q,Wk)
≥ I(Wk¯;A
[k]
N |Q,Wk)
(a)
= H(A
[k]
N |Q,Wk)−H(A
[k]
N |Q,W[1:K])
+H(A
[k]
N |Q,W[1:K],S)
= H(A
[k]
N |Q,Wk)− I(S;A
[k]
N |Q,W[1:K])
≥ H(A
[k]
N |Q,Wk, Q
[k]
N )−H(S)
(b)
= H(A
[k]
N |Q
[k]
N )−H(S)
≥ H(A
[k]
N |Q)−H(S).
Equality (a) holds because the answers A
[k]
N are deterministic
functions of the queries Q, the database W[1:K], and the
common randomness S. In the proof of the converse part
above, we argued that equality (b) holds.
Averaging over all N , and from the proof in Section V-B1
above,
H(S) ≥
1(
N
max(T,E)
) ∑
N∈[1:N ]
|N |=max (T,E)
H(A
[k]
N |Q)
≥
max (T,E)
N
H(A
[k]
[1:N ]|Q)
≥
max (T,E)
N −max (T,E)
H(Wk).
Hence, ρT-ESPIR =
H(S)
H(Wk)
≥ max (T,E)
N−max (T,E) .
VI. DISCUSSION
A. T-BESPIR
In this section, we discuss the case where an adversary
has the ability to tap in on any set E with E nodes, and can
overwrite the answers of any set B with B nodes (the set E
and the set B may intersect, the adversary does not tap in on
the nodes that are in B but not in E). We argue below that
the capacity of T-BESPIR is 1 − 2B+max(T,E)
N
, with shared
common randomness at least
max(T,E)
N−2B−max(T,E) times the size
of a file.
The capacity can be achieved by simply replacing T in
the scheme in Section IV-A by max(T,E). User-privacy,
database-privacy and decodability are guaranteed with the
same arguments as in Section IV-A. To see that the adversary
cannot obtain any information about the database, from (10),
every E answers contains linearly independent combinations
of S1, . . . , Smax(T,E), which are uniformly and independently
chosen from Fq . Therefore, from any E answers, the adver-
sary cannot cancel the Sj’s hence obtains no information
about the database.
The converse can be proved by replacing T in the proof of
the converse in Section IV-B bymax(T,E), and by replacing
the node set T by any node set N with max(T,E) nodes,
the same as in Section V-B. Because if max(T,E) = T , by
Lemma 4 and Lemma 5, we have that H(A
[k]
N |Wk, Q
[k]
N ) =
H(A
[k]
N |Q
[k]
N ) holds; if max(T,E) = E, from equation (3),
I(Wk;A
[k]
N , Q
[k]
N ) = 0, H(A
[k]
N |Wk, Q
[k]
N ) = H(A
[k]
N |Q
[k]
N )
also holds. Therefore, the results are obtained by replacing
T in the results of Section IV-B by max(T,E), that is, R ≤
1− 2B+max(T,E)
N
with ρ ≥ max(T,E)
N−2B−max(T,E) .
B. T-EPIR
In this section, we discuss the case when database-privacy
is not required, with colluding servers and in presence of a
passive eavesdropper, hence called T-EPIR. When E ≥ T ,
from the privacy of the database against the eavesdropper (3),
H(A
[k]
E |Q
[k]
E ) = H(A
[k]
E |Wk, Q
[k]
E ). Lemma 3 still holds for
the PIR problem. With similar steps as in Section V-B1, it can
be proved that R ≥ 1− E
N
. The scheme in Section V-A which
achieves the rate of 1 − E
N
still works for T-EPIR problem.
Hence, we can conclude that for E ≥ T , the capacity of
T − EPIR equals 1 − E
N
. The capacity of T-EPIR for the
case when E < T is our ongoing research.
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